# 2ac

## 1

**A2: Eckert and McConnel Ginet**

**Their kritik of language is reductionist**

**Eckert and McConnel-Ginet 92** (Penelope institute for Research on learning, Sally department of modern languages and linguistics at Cornell University “Think Practically and Look Locally: Language and Gender as Community- Based Practice” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2155996>) JC

Despite the studies of language and gender discussed above we do not yet have a coherent view of the interaction of gender and language. Existing theories have tended to draw on popular conceptions of gender-e.g. as a set of sex-determined attributes of individuals (a kind of "femininity" or "masculin- ity," often associated with a particular division of social activities such as childcare or making war), or as a relation of oppression of females by males. As we have emphasized, gender cannot be understood simply as a matter of individual attributes: Femininity connects to masculinity, femininities and masculinities connect to one another, and all connect to other dimensions of social categorization. Nor is gender reducible to a relation between "women" and "men" as undifferentiated groups. Rather, gender is constructed in a com- plex array of social practices within communities, practices that in many cases connect to personal attributes and to power relations but that do so in varied, subtle, and changing ways. Although a number of scholars have attempted to understand language as rooted in social practice, relatively little progress has been made in explaining how social practices relate to linguistic structures and systems. With only a few exceptions (e.g. 7, 32), linguists have ignored recent work in social theory that might eventually deepen our understanding of the social dimensions of cognition (and of the cognitive dimensions of social practice). Even less atten- tion has been paid to the social (including the linguistic) construction of gender categories: The notions of "women" and "men" are typically taken for granted in sociolinguistics. Nor has much attention been given to the variety of ways gender relations and privilege are constructed. Dominance is often seen as either a matter of deference and/or coercion; other aspects of gender rela- tions-e.g. sexual attraction-are typically ignored. Theoretical work in gen- der studies (e.g. 6, 22, 96, 107) is still not well known among theorists of society and culture (but see 37 as an interesting contribution), and sociolin- guistic studies have only rarely taken advantage of recent developments in understanding gender (but see e.g. 39).

**A2: ‘You Guys’**

**“Guys” in the plural sense refers to both sexes- their criticism applies to the singular useage**

**Dictionary.com ’11** [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/guy]

guy1   [gahy] Show IPA noun, verb, guyed, guy•ing.

noun

1.

Informal. a man or boy; fellow: He's a nice guy.

2.

Usually, guys. Informal. persons of either sex; people: Could one of you guys help me with this?

## T

### 2ac- T- gov to gov

#### “Economic engagement” doesn’t require formal governmental dialogue

Haass 00 – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

## Counterplan

### 2ac – certainty key

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

#### 2. Aerospace – is separate from the other maquilas systems

Guidi 12 – competitive set in the larger media and information landscape consists of organizations focused on creating, partnering and providing global news and cultural perspectives content (Ruxandra, “US Aerospace and Defense Companies Set Up Shop in Mexico”, PRI, 1/6/12, http://pri.org/stories/2012-01-06/us-aerospace-and-defense-companies-set-shop-mexico)//javi

"People's perception about what cross-border manufacturing, what maquiladoras are like, is still based upon what was happening in the 70s and maybe the 1980s," said Kenn Morris, president of Crossborder Group, a San Diego-based market research firm. Morris said the aerospace industry along Mexico's north-western border is nothing like the stereotype of overcrowded, low-skilled factories. "The fact is that a lot of the factories," he said, listing medical devices, aerospace, and electronics, "they're building in such a way these days, and they're managed in such a way, that they can be put anywhere on the planet. But they're coming to Mexico." In the past five to 10 years, more than 50 aerospace and defense companies have started operations in Baja California, according to Mexico's trade ministry. Most of them are American, and they produce everything from electronic components to steel bolts for commercial and military aircraft. These companies employ more than 10,000 high-tech workers, many of them engineers, technicians and software developers. The companies choose this region for its proximity to the US and to western ports catering to Asian markets. But the main reason they come here is simple: the cost of even highly skilled labor is roughly half of what it is in the United States. In San Diego, a senior aerospace engineer makes on average $90,000. In Tijuana, an engineer with similar skills earns $35,000 to $45,000. Cobham, which produces defense systems, made the move to Tijuana in 1997. Inside its factory, workers dressed in royal blue coveralls sit in groups, looking into microscopes, holding tiny tweezers. "Over here we do the tuning and testing of the product," said Javier Urquizo, a plant manager at Cobham. But Urquizo can't tell me exactly what the product is. That's classified information. "So after we finalize the assembly, we need to tweak around some components to get the electrical responses required on the different frequencies," he said. The company has to apply for special licenses from the State Department to build those components here in Mexico – that's to make sure the raw materials and parts and the technology don't get into the wrong hands. Teresa Jesus Rio Ramos, a production supervisor here, said that aerospace and defense companies offer the most stable, best paid jobs of all the Tijuana maquilas. She makes around $1,800 a month. "I think our company is pretty financially stable," she said, "I don't have to worry from month to month whether I'll have a job or not. But that's not true for all maquilas in Tijuana; people get fired and rehired elsewhere all the time."

### 2ac – key to navy

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

### Japan

#### Carriers are key to prevent Taiwan invasion and save the US-Japan alliance

Loo 09, Board Member at Large of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Distinguished Fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, one of the founders of Taiwan’s Formosan independence movement, (Jay T., April 3rd, “A storm is gathering in the Strait”, published under the pen-name Li Thian-hok, Taipei Times)

After years of double-digit increases in China’s military budget and intensive efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China now has the capacity to invade and overwhelm Taiwan in the absence of US intervention. But the US is preoccupied with the financial crisis and the intractable wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. The US military is stretched thin — especially in East Asia. The Taiwanese government, meanwhile, has been feckless in its national defense efforts for more than a decade. China is now Taiwan’s largest export destination. Most of Taiwan’s high-tech manufacturing has moved to China. The resultant outflow of capital, technology and manpower is hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. Yet the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is determined to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement to turn Taiwan’s economy into an appendage of China’s economy. This would not only erode the standard of living in Taiwan but irreparably damage US-Taiwan relations. James Lilley, former US ambassador to China and Taipei, has observed: “Although the Taiwanese love freedom, they love money more.” So what are the practical implications of the above developments? While the TRA stipulates that the “President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan,” in practice Beijing’s reaction is now one of the main considerations. While the TRA imposes on the US a moral obligation to come to Taiwan’s aid in case of Chinese military aggression, William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, wrote in a celebrated paper last fall that if China attacks Taiwan, the US should hold back, observe the war’s progress and take its time in deciding whether to intervene. His reason: The US may risk a strategic failure, in other words, the US may be defeated if it tried to rescue Taiwan. Today there is a gathering crisis in the Taiwan Strait that seems to escape the attention of much of Washington’s policy establishment. A vast majority of the people on Taiwan would reject Chinese communist rule, yet the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government is pursuing a policy of incremental capitulation by reducing the budget and size of Taiwan’s military, deepening the dependency of its economy on China and downgrading Taiwan’s international status. Economic integration measures negotiated by the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT are implemented by the Executive Yuan without public debate or approval by the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is in danger of being delivered into Beijing’s hands by stealth. While most observers believe there has been an easing of tension in the Taiwan Strait because of the concessions the Ma administration has made to China, China has in fact added another 100 missiles to its arsenal targeting Taiwan since Ma took office. The PLA’s preparations for war against Taiwan have not slackened. Because of declining exports, more than 20 million migrant workers in China have lost their jobs. Ann Marie Slaughter, chief of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, has pointed out that China could launch a military venture against a neighbor (meaning Taiwan) to divert attention from growing social unrest at home. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) wants to visit Taiwan and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) has said that Wen would be welcome. Such a visit could trigger massive, bloody protests. The resulting chaos could provide the PLA with a pretext to invade Taiwan. Taiwan is facing double jeopardy: an external military threat from China and internal subversion by the Ma government, which is dominated by radical elements in the KMT who are collaborating with Beijing to demolish Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy as expediently as possible. If Taiwan were to fall by PLA coercion or internal subversion, the US would suffer a **geostrategic disaster**. The sea lanes and air space around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China would be in position to pressure Japan and South Korea to become its vassal states. Given Japan’s unstable domestic politics and its aversion to nuclear weapons, chances are Japan would cave once the credibility of the US as keeper of peace in East Asia had been lost. With the demise of the US-Japan military alliance, the US would be forced to retreat all the way back to Hawaii. Using coercion against Taiwan would mean that China had irreversibly forgone the path of development that would lead to a humane, democratic society in favor of keeping its authoritarian model. This would **inevitably bring it into conflict with the US**. The greatest threat to the US’ homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected, **nuclear Pearl Harbor.**  The basic US national security strategy is misdirected. In order to keep the peace in East Asia and ultimately to protect homeland security, the US must continue to support democracy and uphold the Taiwanese people’s legitimate aspirations for freedom. To keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait and to encourage China to pursue peaceful development, we urge the US president and Congress to take the following steps: First, reaffirm the US policy that the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful means and that the US opposes any unilateral action to change the status quo; Second, deploy at least two aircraft carrier task forces in the Western Pacific and secure basing rights in the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands as part of US efforts to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion;

#### US-China war causes extinction

**Glaser 11**, **PolSci Prof at Goerge Washington,** (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### The alliance solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Armitage 2K - former Deputy Secretary of State, 10-11-2K (Richard, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University)

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come Security Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner. We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements: Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations. Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

## Politics

### 2AC Wont Pass

#### Wont Pass – House GOP Wont Take a Comprehensive Bill, Piecemeal Will Delay Long Enough That the Election Kills Key Reforms, and Rubio Bailed

By Ashley Lopez Florida Center for Investigative Reporting 10/29/2013 Diaz Balart Casts Doubt On President’s New Immigration Reform Strategy Published on October 29, 2013 http://fcir.org/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-obama-house/

President Obama said in a speech at the White House last week that he would be open to the U.S. House’s approach to voting on immigration bills one by one, which could either be immigration reform’s savior or its demise. Rep. Mario Diaz Balart, R-Miami, who has been instrumental in getting immigration reform passed in the House, has been telling reporters that this change in tone is by no means a guarantee that reform will pass during this Congress.¶ A group of Republican House members are now working to get a series of bills together that most of their caucus would vote for. In order for the president to sign those bills, though, one of them would have to provide a path to citizenship for some of the million undocumented immigrants here in the U.S.¶ But the issue of legalization remains one of the most contentious issues in the House. It would even more contentious if a vote is taken close to the 2014 election.¶ And as The Miami Herald notes, the House’s strategy of passing bills one-by-one might prolong the process well into the upcoming election, thus dooming immigration reform:¶ And while Obama called for the House to pass a large bill that could then be reconciled with the Senate version, House Republicans want to approach any changes in piecemeal fashion, a process that at best would push any significant progress into next year.¶ Boehner spokesman Brendan Buck said Thursday that the House “will not consider any massive, Obamacare-style legislation that no one understands.” He said the House is committed to a deliberate, “step-by-step approach.”¶ “Obviously, there is no appetite for one big bill,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart told a group of reporters Wednesday night. The Florida Republican, who had been a member of the unsuccessful bipartisan “gang of eight,” is working with other Republicans on a set of bills that would allow undocumented immigrants to “get right with the law.”¶ Diaz-Balart avoided using the word “legalization” because it has become so politically fraught.¶ Most recently, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida, endorsed the House’s strategy. For a while, he had been behind an effort to pass comprehensive reform. Rubio was part of a bipartisan group in the Senate that wrote and helped move a comprehensive immigration reform bill through to final passage.¶ However, Rubio’s office now says he supports taking a piecemeal approach. Talking Points Memo reports:¶ The most prominent conservative supporter of sweeping immigration reform is calling on Congress to dial back the effort and instead focus on making incremental changes, delivering a significant blow to the prospects of reform. ¶ Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) now opposes a bicameral conference committee to reach a final resolution to the Senate-passed bill, his spokesman said, which anxious pro-reform advocates believe is the only feasible way to salvage the comprehensive overhaul.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell Berman - 10/29/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

#### Obamacare Thumps the Disad

By Russell Berman - 10/29/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has thrown a wrench into President Obama’s push for immigration reform.¶ The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have dominated headlines.¶ The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year.¶ “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June.¶ Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said.¶ Yet the administration’s attention — and message — is clearly divided.¶ The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website.¶ The setback is a familiar one for immigration reform advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law.¶ “It is getting overshadowed,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and it is consuming the president’s attention,” he said of the healthcare rollout.

### 2ac – pc

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key – winners win

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On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Obama can’t influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

October 11, 2013

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

### 2ac – black budget

#### The money for the plan would be taken covertly

Michael E. Salla, PhD Center for Global Peace/School of International Service American University, Washington DC 11/23/2003[ The black budget report, http://www.slideshare.net/ProphecyFactory/the-blackbudgetreport-9017285]

Birth of the Black Budget In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) and consolidated the US military into one entity, the Department of Defense (DoD). One of the issues that remained unresolved from the creation and operation of the CIA was the extent to which its budget and intelligence activities would remain a secret. According to Article 1, sec. 9, of the US Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” This constitutional requirement conflicted with the need for secrecy concerning Congressional appropriations for the CIA. The solution was for Congress to pass legislation approving the secrecy over the funding mechanisms used for the CIA and its intelligence related activities. The necessary bill was passed with great haste and minimal debate causing considerable concern among those few Congressmen brave enough to openly challenge the constitutionality of the Act. [3] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York voted for the bill but protested: “If the members of the Armed Services Committee can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot the entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the untouchables? Secrecy is the answer.” [4] Celler, like the majority of Congressmen, passed the CIA Act very much like the wealthy father viewed the birth of an illegitimate child, appropriate care would be taken to provide for the child, but there would be no official admission of patrimony and the responsibility that entails. The 1949 CIA Act comprised additions to those sections of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the creation of CIA. The 1949 CIA Act gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the creation of a ‘black budget’ as the following sections make clear: … any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations [emphasis added]. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred. [5] This section meant that funds could be transferred from the appropriations of other government departments earmarked for specific tasks, “without regard to any provisions of law”. For example, a Congressional appropriation earmarked for housing subsidies to low-income workers by Housing and Urban Development (HUD), could be legally transferred either to the CIA for covert intelligence activities or through the CIA to a DoD associated intelligence agency for a classified program. Thus HUD employees might find that their relevant housing programs were lacking the necessary funds for relief efforts even though Congress had appropriated these funds for this purpose. Any HUD official unfortunate enough as to enquire into the location of the missing funds would be deterred from pursuing the issue, and if these officials persisted, they could be summarily dismissed, and then exposed to a variety of CIA activities to silence them. [6] Despite its legal authority to transfer funds from other federal agencies regardless of what their Congressional appropriations were for, the conventional wisdom was that the major source of appropriations for the CIA came through the DoD. This is apparently what President Truman had in mind when he approved that the "operating funds for the organization [CIA] would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead of directly from Congress." [7] This funding arrangement ostensibly assured that the CIA would be subordinate to the Secretaries of Defense and State who would be in a better position to influence its covert activities. Four years after passage of the 1949 CIA Act, the following categories and sums in the relevant defense force appropriations apparently provided the bulk of the black budget funding of the CIA.

### 2ac – defense spending popular

#### Defense spending is popular among Republicans

Kredo 3/21/13 – award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others (Adam, “GOP united on keeping defense spending intact”, Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/defending-defense/)

Republican leaders are dismissing charges that the party is fractured on national security issues following the overwhelming passage of a House GOP budget measure that fully restored recently slashed defense spending. The House on Thursday approved by a vote of 228-191 a wide-ranging budget plan authored by Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.). All but 10 Republicans voted in favor of the budget, while every Democrat voted against it. The Ryan plan would allocate about $560.2 billion in defense spending in 2014. That appropriation would all but negate the effects of the recent sequester, which eradicated millions in defense spending and threw the Pentagon into chaos. The allocation would prevent the Pentagon and United States military from being forced to implement a devastating series of cuts that would imperil not only troop readiness but also their benefits. A similar budget proposal authored by the House’s deficit-conscious Republican Study Committee (RSC) also included this level of defense spending, leading Republican leaders to dismiss charges that the party is fundamentally split on such issues. “The overwhelming conservative support for the Ryan budget and the RSC budget are the best indicators of where the Republican Party is on national security that I have seen in a while,” House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) told the Free Beacon following the vote. “After the saga of sequestration, we have come together as a party to declare that our military has been cut too much,” McKeon said. “By passing the House budget, we are making a restoration of vital national security resources a top policy priority, every bit as important as balancing the budget.”

### General – XO Solves

#### XO solves

Nakamura 1-6 – David Nakamura and Tara Bahrampour, January 6th, 2013 "Obama using authority for immigrant issues," Washington Post, www.journalgazette.net/article/20130106/NEWS03/301069950/1066/NEWS03

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration’s decision this week to ease visa requirements for hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants represents its latest move to reshape immigration through executive action, even as the White House gears up for an uncertain political fight over a far-more-sweeping legislative package in the months ahead.¶ Immigration advocates on Thursday hailed a rule change at the Department of Homeland Security that would make it easier for many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States as they seek permanent residency, saying it will improve the lives of relatives who could have been separated for years without the changes.¶ For President Obama – who has called the inability to achieve comprehensive immigration reform among the biggest regrets of his first term – the new policy is among a series of steps his administration has taken over the past year aimed in part at easing the pace of deportations, which have surged during his tenure. The steps also came amid a presidential campaign that included sharp disagreements over immigration policy and strong support among Latinos and Asians for Obama.¶ The centerpiece was Obama’s decision, announced last June, to stop deporting people who were brought to the country as children and have gone on to be productive and otherwise law-abiding residents.¶ “He is checking off every administrative box he can of what he can do with executive authority that comports with his overall view of immigration policy,” said Angela Kelley, an analyst at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank allied with the White House.¶ The latest policy change is focused on illegal immigrants who have a spouse, parent or child with U.S. citizenship. Currently, in order to become legal they must leave the United States and apply for a waiver forgiving their unlawful presence in the country. Only then can they apply for an immigrant visa. And if they don’t get a waiver, they are barred from returning to the United States for up to 10 years, depending on the case.¶ The specter of being barred deterred many from applying. But under the rule change finalized Wednesday, those who qualify will be able to apply for waivers from within the United States starting March 4. Applicants must return to their native country for a brief period for the consular immigrant visa process.¶ The new rule greatly reduces the risk inherent in applying for a waiver, as people whose applications are rejected would still be in the United States when they heard the news. Even for those whose applications are approved, the new rule will allow them to spend much less time outside the United States, as they will travel abroad with waivers in hand.

### General – CIR Fails

#### Immigration cant solve the flood of applications

Murthy 9 (Law Firm, “What if CIR Passes? Can USCIS Handle the Increased Workload?”, NewsBrief, 10-30, http://www.murthy.com/news/n\_cirwkl.html)

Any type of legalization program will face significant opposition, particularly during an economic downturn. However, given the numbers of individuals possibly eligible, even under a less expansive program, the USCIS must prepare for a potential onslaught of applications if any type of CIR passes and becomes the law. As many MurthyDotCom and MurthyBulletin readers know from personal experience, the USCIS has historically suffered from backlogs and capacity issues. Were such a measure to pass, absent substantial changes, a flood of new applications could pose a significant challenge to the processing capacity of the USCIS. *USCIS Preparing to Expand Rapidly, Should Need Arise* A Reuters blog quoted USCIS spokesman, Bill Wright, as saying, “The agency has been preparing for the advent of any kind of a comprehensive immigration reform, and if that means a surge of applications and operations, we have been working toward that.” USCIS Director, Alejandro Mayorkas, has stated that the goal of the USCIS is to be ready to expand rapidly to handle the increase in applications that would result from CIR. In the past, opponents have used lack of capacity and preparation as an argument against CIR and expansion of eligibility for immigration benefits. *Will CIR Result in Increased or Reduced Backlogs for Others?* Legal immigrants and their employers have concerns about being disadvantaged by any CIR legislation that would provide benefits to undocumented workers. However, true CIR is not limited to these provisions, and would be expected to contain provisions regarding various aspects of legal immigration. CIR certainly will be hotly debated and any proposed legislation will be modified throughout the debate process. As part of the preparations of the USCIS, and in order not to harm those who have already initiated cases under existing law, the USCIS needs to continue to work on backlogs. While significant progress has been made in many areas, and case processing times have been improved greatly, there are still case backlogs that need to be addressed.

#### Private contractors hired to implement the plan causes fraud

West 7 (Bill, Chief of the National Security Section – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster”, 5-17, [http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/ 05/immigration\_reform\_will\_be\_nat.php](http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/%2005/immigration_reform_will_be_nat.php))

CIS has indicated it would need to bring in private contractor personnel to help deal with the monumental workload increase from reform legislation. Such contractors will invariably be quickly hired, poorly trained, probably low-bid, barely vetted and far more subject to bribery and corruption than permanent Government employees. Not that bribery and corruption will necessarily be that necessary. In short order, the system will be overwhelmed. Whatever minimal fraud detection and prevention safeguards might be erected won’t last long in the face of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of applications and petitions to be adjudicated. What that means is the information provided on those applications and petitions, and whatever supporting documents they may have (if any), will essentially be taken at face value. Whatever the applicant alien tells the adjudicator will essentially be taken at face value. There will be little time or process available to verify anything, perhaps beyond running the applicant’s name through a standard battery of computer databases (and, even that may become so time consuming some will slip through the cracks).

#### Won’t net increase immigration

Benson 2 (Lenni B., Professor of Law – New York Law School, “Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform”, Administrative Law Review, Winter, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, Lexis)

Many of the process failures arise from the failure of Congress and the agencies to adequately contend with the internal and external forces that shape the agency culture. n313 Although many of these factors operate in other areas of administrative law, several are particularly strong in immigration law. The failure to plan for and counteract these forces, has directly contributed to the erosion of the essential process values. n313 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 91 (1989) ("Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationship within an organization."). Wilson goes on to note that many organizations have multiple cultures and the relationship of the agency culture(s) to the agency mission may dramatically impact the effectiveness of the organization. See id. at 91-92. Here I am using culture in a broad manner to encompass both the internal and external forces that shape the organizations. a. Congressional Mandates and Dictated Priorities Congress must bear a large part of the responsibility for the crisis in immigration adjudications. n314 Congress mandated express and implied priorities in the statutes n315 or demanded prioritization of specific programs with  [\*283]  the threat of reduced funding or of imposing new statutory mandates. n316 For example, some statutory limits force an allocation of resources to a particular visa category without adequate consideration of how the allocation might disadvantage or paralyze a separate function. Two of the most obvious examples are the naturalization and H-1B petitions. When Congress pressures INS to reform and expedite its naturalization backlogs, the Service Centers move personnel away from the adjustment of status processing and the processing of the employment-based immigrant petitions. n317 The limitation of the total number of H-1B visas, necessitated that the INS put auditing procedures in place to be sure they did not approve more H-1B visas than the statute allowed. n318 Employers worrying about the cap filed large numbers of petitions in the winter and early spring to avoid being shut out of the category altogether. n319 Moving adjudicators to meet the thirty-day deadline meant other visa petitions had to sit waiting for adjudication. n314 Politics presents a treacherous double-edged sword for the INS' efficient and appropriate facilitation of immigration. The highly political debate persists about how vigorously the INS should control illegal immigration. When the INS engages in activities such as surprise work-site inspection, criticism immediately flows from immigrant groups and its conduct is subject to congressional scrutiny and investigation. Yet, on the other hand, if lawmakers perceive the INS as remiss in their duties, they immediately capitalize on the agency's unpopularity by encouraging resentment against it as congressional elections approach. A similar situation plagues other agencies, such as the IRS. See GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 12; see also Laurent, supra note 12, 13-18 (outlining Government Performance Project in detail). n315 See INA � 214(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. � 1184(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (mandating thirty day processing for H-1B and L-1 petitions). n316 See Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 183-213 (2000) (transcribing detailed questioning of how appropriated money to INS will be spent). n317 See supra text accompanying notes 183-85 and 215-16 (discussing current backlog problems). n318 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting numerical limitations imposed by statute). n319 Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (July 8, 2000). Although Congress did not intend the agency to suspend other operations, the management of the agency responded to congressional and community pressure. However, the failure to adjudicate one type of petition means that pressure will mount in other categories or unnecessary work will be created. For example, if the immigrant petition cannot be processed in time, the employee will need a renewal of non-immigrant status. The extension petition could have been eliminated altogether if the INS had been able to process the I-140 in a timely fashion. The failure to adjudicate the adjustment of status applications meant that fewer people became permanent residents and a push to rush through cases created a bulge in the workflow. The sudden increase in workload resulted in delayed processing. Delayed processing means the initial grants of work or travel authorization expire. To obtain extensions of these, the individual must make a formal request and the INS has more work for its adjudication officers. n320 n320 See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. � 214.2 (2000) (detailing general requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status). One bulge can build into a tidal wave five years later. In 1986, Congress authorized a legalization program resulting in more than three million people  [\*284]  becoming permanent residents over a five-year period. n321 Because permanent residents cannot apply for naturalization until they have completed five years of resident status, n322 the INS began to experience an upswing in the number of naturalization applications. n323 If the INS allows backlogs to grow, and then, through special initiatives, completes the adjustment of status applications for record numbers of people, the bulge will reappear a few years later in naturalization applications and in relative petitions for the employees' family members who have not yet immigrated to the United States.

#### Multiple examples go neg

Fareed Zakaria 09 (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war**

**MacDonald and Parent 11**

MacDonald**,** Asst Prof. of PoliSci @ Williams College andParent, Asst Prof. PoliSci @ U of Miami, 2011

Paul and Joseph, “Graceful Decline?”, International Security, 35.4, Project MUSE

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Our ev cites 93 examples

Miller 2K, Prof @ U Ottawa,

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

Perhaps one should ask, as some scholars do, whether it is not poverty as such but some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that is the factor that contributes in a significant way to the denouement of war. This calls for addressing the question: do wars spring from a popular reaction to an economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and/or from a heightened awareness of the poor of the wide and growing disparities in wealth and incomes that diminishes their tolerance to poverty? It seems reasonable to believe that a powerful "shock" factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership. The leadership, finding that this sudden adverse economic and social impact destabilizing, would possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. There would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis according to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong …..The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes….(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.)

## K

### 2ac Framework- Normal

Framework – Our interpretation is that the neg gets the status quo or competitive policy option – that’s key to fairness- infinite assumptions in the 1AC– we should get the aff as offense – also key to plan focus which is necessary for in depth debates

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation—Effective decision making and TESTING of their ethic requires you to evaluate their material manifestation—The alternative is voting for an FYI without a mechanism to resolve their link arguments

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### We make the maquiladora industry net better- we upgrade it to second and third generation plants not use sweatshops

### 2ac – heg good

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

### AT: Patriarchy

#### Heg decline turns the impact – forces securitization and nationalism

Brzezinski, ’12 [Zbigniew, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, national security advisor under Jimmy Carter, “After America: How does the world look in an age of U.S. decline? Dangerously unstable,” Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america]

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

### 2ac – alt fails – IR

#### Their attempt to critique IR from a new feminist perspective fails – their change to militarization is nothing but a footnote

Jones, PolSci Professor at Okanagan, ’96 (Adam, October, “Does ‘Gender’ Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations” Review of International Studies, Vol 22 No 4, JSTOR)

Rather less of a cause for optimism is the hollow claim by some feminist IR scholars that they are constructing a radically new theorizing of international relations, and a research agenda to guide the project. In my view, it is the post-positivist line of analysis that exhibits the widest disparity between stated ambition and substantive contribution. Given this strand's recent prominence, it is worth considering the claims of one of its major exponents in some detail. Christine Sylvester's 1994 work Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era angrily rejects the notion that feminist theory ought to be playing essentially a supplementary role. Criticizing Robert Keohane for proposing something along these lines, Sylvester writes: Explicit in this analysis is yet another support assignment for "women." We who are feminists in the academy are urged to come out of our vague and homeless positions in IR in order to provide something that the mainsteam [sic] needs and cannot think through and provide using its own powers of reflection . . . There is, in this admonition, little sense that feminists can set an agenda for ourselves and for IR and really no sense that we may want to interface differently and rewrite-repaint-recook the field rather than join it.39

But the specifics of the 're-visioning', in Sylvester's formulation, seem meager. 'It would be refreshing to see a recreation of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the situated standpoint of John McCone's wife', Sylvester writes, because she 'experienced, and perhaps even influenced, the first round of the bureaucratic politics game'.40 This is the sole concrete example of a feminist-influenced research agenda that Sylvester advances in a chapter-long discussion of the 'second debate' in IR theory. Perhaps such an inquiry would be refreshing, but there is frankly little to indicate that it would be revelatory. And there is no evidence so far that investigations of this type could lead to a radically new theorizing of IR. One would expect, instead, more in the way of historical footnotes. Sylvester's more detailed attempts to 'move beyond analysis by metaphor' and 'repaint the canvases of IR' similarly bog down in movements, settings, and phenomena (the Greenham Common women and Zimbabwean agricultural cooperatives) which strike this writer as marginal, if that word still retains its pejorative connotations.41

### 2ac – at: liberalism link

#### Liberalism is not inherently oppressive to women. The proclamation of human rights and liberal governance open the space for women’s liberation, not the other way around.

Teson, Professor of Law, Arizona State University, in ‘93

[Fernando R., “Feminism and International Law: A Reply”, Virginia Journal of International Law, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 647, Spring]

A conspiratorial explanation of the modern state is not only impoverished and simplistic; n87 it also overlooks both the magnitude and the direction of the social forces unleashed when the universality of human rights was proclaimed by the "bourgeoisie." n88 Feminists, radical and liberal, are correct that many of the architects (and stewards) of liberalism have intended the exclusion of women from many of the benefits of liberty. This, however, was the precipitate of a mistaken anthropology, not a mistaken ethics. n89 Once the prejudice against women was exposed as such, the universality of liberal moral theory, logically entailed by the belief in the inherent dignity of all persons, acquired, as it were, a life of its own, and resulted in an astonishing improvement of the predicament of women in free societies. Given the egalitarian consequences of the Enlightenment and the liberal revolutions that it inspired, one is hard pressed to describe the modern liberal state and the international alliance of liberal states as inherently oppressive of women. More plausibly, they have been the matrix of women's liberation.

### 2ac – epistemology testing

#### Our epistemology is one of science-in-the-making – we present the 1AC not as a set of truth claims about the state of the world but rather as a means to begin contestation over those claims in order to establish truth – they try to remove the ideological blinders of the 1AC before we try to open those blinders up for criticism and debate

Walby, Sociology Professor at Leeds, ‘1 (Sylvia, Winter, “Against Epistemological Chasms: The Science Question in Feminism Revisited” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol 26 No 2, JSTOR)

Monolithic? Much of the feminist critique of science rests on a view that it is a unified, cohesive body of authoritative knowledge that inappropriately assumes the status of truth. Haraway (1988, 584) alleges that science is a monolithic arrogant body that does a "god trick." This phrase is often repeated approvingly in writings on feminist epistemology, and in the repetition it becomes a caricature. Scientists are accused of making false claims to truth, of misplaced confidence in science's knowledge production -in short, of hubris (Harding 1986). They are accused of making claims to universal truth that cannot be justified and of lacking in the humility that is presumed more appropriate to partial knowledge. Thus, a "god trick" within contemporary science is both presumed to be the norm and simultaneously condemned (Haraway 1988). Modern scholarship within the sociology of science has shown that science-in-the-making is based on constant questioning and internal critique, with knowledge claims contested - always considered provisional and "facts" constantly being created.8 Studies of laboratory life show that actual scientific practice is continually riddled with conflict and negotiation, contestation and compromise, argument and disagreement (Latour and Woolgar 1979). It is useful to make a distinction between the period of science-in-the making and the stage when results are considered established (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987). In the former there is extensive disputation. In the latter, the findings are treated as "facts" and the prior history of contestation is not held out for public display. The final "inscriptions," or texts such as academic articles, that enable the results of laboratory science to be communicated more widely rest on this prior process of contestation, even if the transformation of provisional claims into widely accepted, stable "facts" demands that the prior history of contestation is erased. Thus any simple dismissal of empirically based science founded on science's monolithic nature and arrogant truth claims should be rejected as misrepresenting the processes involved. At best, it misunderstands the final stage of consolidation of knowledge as if it were the whole of science, while neglecting the prior processes of science-in-the-making. Indeed, Haraway (1989, 1997), in her detailed empirical work on the history of primatology and contemporary technoscience, is well aware of the controversy and dispute underlying the changing content of knowledge. However, these detailed accounts do not circulate as widely as her more polemical summary statements, and these are not a widely cited part of her work. Rather, there is approving replication of the quote on the "god trick" as characterizing science. The dominant reading of Haraway is based on a neglect of her in-depth analysis of scientific controversy and based on her shorter writings that refer to science as authoritative (1990). The significance of such divisions and contestations within science is that there is not the permanent and irrevocable closure against women that standpoint theory implies. Women are not just the passive victims of a monolithic science. Rather, there are spaces and places where feminists have joined the arguments and won. Two examples of changes in understanding of forms of gender inequality as a result of feminist research are in the areas of male violence against women and the inequality of men's and women's wages. Feminist researchers changed the view that male violence against women is rare to one in which it was recognized as a widespread social problem. Before feminist social scientists engaged with the field, the dominant conception of male violence against women was that it was the rare product of a few mentally ill men (West, Roy, and Nichols 1978) about which little needed to be done. Rigorous feminist research demonstrated that male violence was too widespread to be explained in such a way (Russell 1982, 1984; Johnson 1996), that it had a devastating effect on women who were subjected to it (Kelly 1988), that it restricted the movements of the majority of women in their search for safety (Johnson 1996), and that the criminal justice system was culpable in its treatment of the issue (Adler 1987). Today it is not only an issue for feminists in a handful of Western countries but is regarded as a global issue at the level of the United Nations, having been placed on the international human-rights agenda. Second, research led by feminists refuted the claim that the gap in wages between women and men was just reward for women since they had not invested in their education and employment because of their commitment to the family (Mincer and Polachek 1974) and showed that it was partly the result of deeply sedimented discriminatory practices against women, such as occupational segregation (Hartmann 1976; Treiman and Hartmann 1981). Feminist scholarship made most impact when it involved the building of links with mainstream bodies, such as, in the case of male violence, Statistics Canada (Johnson 1996), and in the case of the wages gap, the National Research Council (Treiman and Hartmann 1981). "Science" is not a unified patriarchal whole. Controversy is the norm in science-in-the-making. Feminists have joined the argument and sometimes have won - and, in so doing, they have transformed the field of inquiry.

#### Perm do both- Permutation solves their links best while avoiding dangerous utopianism—taking an all or nothing approach on the question of what is war makes effective decision-making impossible.

### Prioritization Turn

#### Political calculations that prioritize combatting one form of oppression over another make BOTH inevitable – ignores the interrelation of power

Mikdashi, 2011 (Jun 29, Maya, Co-Founder of Jadaliyya, PhD candidate at Columbia University's Department of Anthropology, “What is [the] left?,” <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2012/what-is_the_left>)

I have been reading accounts of the demise of the Lebanese left with some ambivalence. After all, has the word “left” come to only mean supporting the resistance? Is supporting Hezbollah, the group that is only the most recent incarnation of Lebanese resistance to Israel (and an incarnation with troubling economic policies, at that), all it takes to win your “leftist” credentials in Lebanon today? What about other historically progressive issues, such as questions of gender and economic equity, or political rights and the freedom of expression? Since the protests began in Syria, many Lebanese activists who consider themselves part of "the left" (you can see many of them, chain smoking their way through cups of coffee in cafes) have been wringing their hands over the fate of the Syrian regime while self-proclaimed “leftist parties” have been chest pounding their way through Ras Beirut. I recently told a friend of mine that I was working on a piece for Jadaliyya about the fatwa issued by Lebanon's Mufti “analyzing” a proposed civil law to protect women and children (but not, it seems, men) against domestic violence. This particular "leftist" patiently explained to me that now is not the time write about these “micro” issues, not while the “greater good” is at stake. My friend was telling me that my time and intellect were better spent writing about “the big picture.” But what exactly is this bigger picture if not an intricate mosaic of interconnected inequalities, and what is the “greater good” if not a silent prayer for those people that will be sacrificed in order to achieve it? A week ago I was walking with another friend on Hamra street, and I was confronted by a group of male protestors waving SSNP flags and pictures of Bashar al-Asad. Watching this almost pornographic show of support for a regime that has always been most effective when repressing its own people, I was reminded of the invasion of Kuwait. Back then, I watched the television as Scud Missiles unleashed by “the Great Arab leader” Saddam Hussein landed on Tel Aviv. At the time, Saddam was said to be Salahuddin incarnate. Never mind the fact that Salahuddin was a Kurd, and Saddam Hussein's Anfal campaign killed, displaced, and maimed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds. More than a decade later, in July of 2003, I was sitting in a Baghdad hotel room in the middle of the US-occupied city. I was watching a dear friend and colleague say that in 1991, Saddam had bought the Arab world with a few ineffectual Scud Missiles, leaving him free to intensify his necrophilic regime and call himself the defender of the Arabs against US-Israeli interests. I felt small then, watching these words fall from my colleague's mouth like a stone into my chest. I now know that in fact power is always allied to power, and that Saddam's regime, like Husni Mubarak's, Ben Ali's, and Asad's was, and is, tied to a complex knot of alliances and counter-alliances with US-Israeli-Saudi interests. Power moves in a current through multiple registers and it is expressed by different actors through different technologies, but it always leaves and exploits a bruised vulnerability. It is this current of power put into action when a dictator gives an order to shoot at protestors, when an Israeli soldier makes a Palestinian wait in the sun, or when a Lebanese husband knows that he can legally enter his wife's vagina with his penis with or without her consent. These expressions of power are structurally different, but they are all united in their purpose to protect and extend unequally distributed power relations. Similarly, while the injustices of foreign occupation and dispossession, domestic authoritarianism, and sexual violence should not be uncritically equated and thus amalgamated into some vague cry about the state of the world, we should also not accept the political fragmentation and alienation that comes with parsing out injuries and oppressions and weighing them to see which deserves our attention. We should not look at “the big picture” and forget that it is painted with the brushes of many injustices, and many injuries. Writing this lament from Beirut while a revolution is being brutally oppressed in Syria and while Israel continues to threaten the next invasion, I think of Iraq in 2003. Sitting in that Baghdad hotel room one month after the US led invasion and destruction of most of that country, and remembering the posters of Saddam Hussein hastily pasted on the streets of Beirut following those Scud Missiles in 1991, I felt cheap. Just as I feel cheap today, arguing with some self proclaimed “leftists” that we can be against authoritarianism and against US-Israeli interests. That we can be both [and] pro-democracy and pro-Palestine, both pro-revolution and anti-Zionist. That we should not allow our fear of what might come after stop us from acting with our principles, now.

### 2ac – at: root cause

#### Patriarchy’s not the root cause

Bell 06, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University,

(Duncan, “Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory,” *International Affairs* 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the ‘end of history’ and now a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of ‘masculine values’, which are ‘rooted in biology’. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. ‘Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.’ Moreover, the ‘line from chimp to modern man is continuous’ and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative ‘feminized’ zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as ‘masculine policies’ are essential in dealing with a masculine world: ‘In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.’ Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise—free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a particular political objective. This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama’s argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama’s claims about the animal world display ‘a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence’.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender that although biological differences do play a minor role, focusing so heavily on them is profoundly misleading.50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama’s essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics

### Drones

#### Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production

Godoy 5/11/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies

By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

#### Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

# 1ar

# \*\*Case

# China

### Discourse K

#### Discourse doesn’t shape reality (optional)

Fram-Cohen 85 (Michelle Fram-Cohen 1985 “Reality, Language, Translation” American Translators Association Conference in Miami)

The idea that language is created inside one's mind independently of outside experience eliminates the possibility that the external world is the common source of all languages. But a common source of all languages underlies any attempt to explain the possibility of translation. Chomsky suggests that the common basis of all languages is universal phonetics and semantics, with the result that "certain objects of human thoughts and mentality are essentially invariable across languages." (13) To the best of my knowledge Chomsky did not develop this idea in the direction of explaining the possibility of translation. In contrast, linguist Eugene Nida insists that outside experience is the common basis of all languages when he writes that "each language is different from all other languages in the ways in which the sets of verbal symbol classify the various elements of experience." (14) ida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation.

# Heg

### 1NC Prolif Good (New)

#### Empirical evidence proves deterrence solves- no great power wars since the nuke- negotiation strategies pigeon-hole U.S. into preventative wars

Zakaria 12 – editor at large of Time Magazine

(Fareed, “Deterrence works”, The Washington Post. Mar 15, 2012. Proquest)

I am reminded of that turbulent meeting as I listen to the debates over Iran’s nuclear ambitions because it highlights a strange role reversal in today’s foreign policy discourse. It used to be the left that refused to accept the idea of deterrence — searching instead for options such as a nuclear freeze. And it used to be those on the right who would patiently explain the practical virtues of deterrence.¶ “About once every 25 years, a new generation discovers the horrors of the bomb and the paradoxes of deterrence, and begins looking for a way out. But there are only so many times that one can present the apocalypse . . . so many beguiling alternatives to pursue and discard. Inevitably, the debate grinds to a halt pretty much where it began: affirming, while deploring, the necessity of relying on the balance of terror to preserve the peace.” That was Charles Krauthammer, writing in the New Republic in 1984. “Deterrence, like old age, is intolerable, until one considers the alternative,” he explained. Yet today it is the right that has decided that deterrence is a lie. Krauthammer, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and others denounce containment and deterrence and would lead us instead to a policy that culminates in a preventive war. It is the right’s version of the nuclear freeze — a simple solution that actually doesn’t solve anything. Strikes on Iran would probably delay its program a few years while driving up domestic support for the government in Tehran and providing it with a much stronger rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet sophisticated conservatives insist that this route is preferable to deterrence.¶ Deterrence is a difficult concept to accept because it is counterintuitive: The prospect of destruction produces peace. And yet its record is remarkable. Great powers went to war with brutal regularity for hundreds of years. Then came nuclear weapons, and there has not been a war between great powers since 1945 — the longest period of peace between great powers in history. The United States and the Soviet Union had a more intense and far-reaching rivalry than almost any two great powers ever. Each thought the other wanted to destroy its way of life. And yet, this rivalry did not result in war. Both sides were deterred.¶ In 1989, Margaret Thatcher said in a toast to Mikhail Gorbachev, “Both our countries know from bitter experience that conventional weapons do not deter war in Europe, whereas nuclear weapons have done so for over 40 years. As a deterrent there is no substitute for them.”¶ If deterrence doesn’t work, then why are we not preparing preventive war against Russia, which still has a fearsome arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles? Or against Pakistan, home to a military-intelligence regime that has been implicated in more major acts of terrorism in the past 10 years than Iran has in the past hundred? The argument that Iran would be deterred does not rest on its reasonableness but on the regime’s desire to survive. “Rulers want to have a country that they can continue to rule,” says Kenneth Waltz, one of the most distinguished theorists of international relations.¶ To gain credibility with his conservative critics and with the current Israeli government, President Obama has gone along with them, ruled out containment, insisted that he does not bluff and spoken of a “window” of opportunity for negotiations. This might prove a serious error: It boxes in the United States, limits Obama’s options and forces him on a path that could push him into an unnecessary, preventive war.¶ Anguish over the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon is understandable. It would be better for Israel, the Middle East and the world if Tehran does not acquire such weapons. The U.S. effort, in collaboration with almost the entire international community, to prevent this from happening and to put tremendous pressure on Tehran, is the right policy. But were Tehran to persist, were its regime to accept the global isolation and crippling costs that would come from its decision, a robust policy of containment and deterrence would work toward Iran as it did against Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, Kim Jong Il’s North Korea and the Pakistani military.

#### Non-proliferation moves guarantee proliferation- added incentive for a nuclear deterrent

Waltz 12 – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs. Why Iran Should get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf)

The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and¶ Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened¶ its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in¶ January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and¶ Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.¶ It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED¶ The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent.¶ The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout¶ capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a¶ sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb.

#### Iran prolif key to solve Iran-Israel conflict

Waltz 12 – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs. Why Iran Should get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf)

But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so¶ far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED¶ In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the¶ instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have.¶ There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally¶ dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because¶ open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran.¶ But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little¶ purpose.¶ Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should¶ take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

#### Israeli strikes escalate- success irrelevant

Goldberg ‘10 (Jeffrey Goldberg, National correspondent for the Atlantic, “The Point of No Return,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/>, September 2010)

When the Israelis begin to bomb the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, the formerly secret enrichment site at Qom, the nuclear-research center at Esfahan, and possibly even the Bushehr reactor, along with the other main sites of the Iranian nuclear program, a short while after they depart en masse from their bases across Israel—regardless of whether they succeed in destroying Iran’s centrifuges and warhead and missile plants, or whether they fail miserably to even make a dent in Iran’s nuclear program—they stand a good chance of changing the Middle East forever; of sparking lethal reprisals, and even a full-blown regional war that could lead to the deaths of thousands of Israelis and Iranians, and possibly Arabs and Americans as well; of creating a crisis for Barack Obama that will dwarf Afghanistan in significance and complexity; of rupturing relations between Jerusalem and Washington, which is Israel’s only meaningful ally; of inadvertently solidifying the somewhat tenuous rule of the mullahs in Tehran; of causing the price of oil to spike to cataclysmic highs, launching the world economy into a period of turbulence not experienced since the autumn of 2008, or possibly since the oil shock of 1973; of placing communities across the Jewish diaspora in mortal danger, by making them targets of Iranian-sponsored terror attacks, as they have been in the past, in a limited though already lethal way; and of accelerating Israel’s conversion from a once-admired refuge for a persecuted people into a leper among nations.

\*\*\*2. Turn—A. Plan causes bioweapons\*\*\*

Zilinskas Director, CBW Nonprolif Program, 2000

[After earning a Ph.D. in 1981, Dr. Zilinskas worked at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1981 - 1982), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1982 - 1986), and the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute. In addition, while at Maryland he was an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of International Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health, the Johns Hopkins University. In 1993, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed a William Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where he worked on biological and toxin warfare issues. In April 1994, ACDA seconded Dr. Zilinskas to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for seven months, during which time he participated in two biological warfare-related inspections in Iraq (June and October 1994) encompassing 61 biological research and production facilities. At UNSCOM headquarters, he set up a database containing data about key dual-use biological equipment in Iraq and developed a protocol to guide UNSCOM's on-going monitoring and verification program in the biological field. After the fellowship ended, Dr. Zilinskas returned to the Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology and Johns Hopkins University. In addition, he became a long-term consultant to ACDA (which now is part of the U.S Department of State), for which he carried out studies on Cuban allegations of U.S. biological attacks against its people, animals, and plants and investigations carried out by the United Nations of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf region. Dr. Zilinskas remains to this day a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense. On September 1, 1998, Dr. Zilinskas began working as a Senior Scientist in Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA. His research focuses on achieving effective biological arms control, the proliferation potential of the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, and meeting the threat of bioterrorism. He also is a Research Professor at the Graduate School of International Politics at MIIS, where he teaches courses on biological and chemical weapons and arms control and emerging issues in international public health. Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense p1-2]

There are many who believe that today’s bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecular biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be attempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

\*\*\*B.Bio attack causes extinction—could kill all health care workers making treatment and quarantine impossible.\*\*\*

Posner, federal appeals circuit judge who has written books on a variety of legal and social issues, 4 [Richard, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response*, Oxford University Press]

Yet before any of these dramatic climatic changes occurred, the human race might have exterminated itself through engineered plagues devised and disseminated by lunatics inspired with apocalyptic visions: With the aid of gene-splicing kits stolen from high school classrooms, religious terrorists and rogue scientists create a strain of the smallpox vaccine that is incurable, is immune to vaccine, and kills all its victims, rather than just 30 percent as in the case of natural smallpox. In a single round-the-world flight, a biological Unabomber, dropping off inconspicuous aerosol dispensers in major airports, infects several thousand people with the juiced-up smallpox. In the 12 to 14 days before symptoms appear, each of the initially infected victims infects five or six others, who in turn infect five or six others, and so on. Within a month more than 100 million people are infected, including almost all health workers and other "first responders," making it impossible to establish and enforce a quarantine. Before a vaccine or cure can be found, all but a few human beings, living in remote places, have died. Lacking the requisite research skills and production facilities, the remnant cannot control the disease and soon succumb as well.

# Politics

## 1ar- Farm Bill Thumper

#### Farm bill and food stamps thump

Jalonick 10/30, Mary Clane (“Congress begins negotiations on food stamp cuts, farm programs” http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/229885621.html\\CLans)

WASHINGTON — House and Senate negotiators have begun talks on crafting a compromise farm bill, including cuts to the food stamp program. The talks opened Wednesday afternoon, just two days before food stamp recipients will see a separate, unrelated cut in their monthly benefits. On Friday, a temporary benefit from the 2009 stimulus that boosted food stamp dollars will expire. According to the Agriculture Department, that means a family of four receiving food stamps will receive $36 less a month. The cuts are expected to reduce the almost $80 billion program by almost $5 billion next year. If passed, the farm bill cuts would be on top of that amount. The cost of the program has more than doubled since 2008 as the economy has struggled, and Republicans say it needs to be better targeted to only the neediest people. Legislation passed by the GOP-controlled House would cut food stamps by an additional $4 billion annually and change eligibility and work requirements. The Senate farm bill would cut a tenth of that amount, with Democrats and President Barack Obama opposing major cuts.

## PC Fails – Drezner

#### Ideological interests outweigh political capital

Drezner, 13 – is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a senior editor at The National Interest (Daniel, 10-2, “American Politics 101, R.I.P.”http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/02/american\_politics\_101\_rip)djm

The U.S. federal government continues to stay shut down, and analysts are beginning to realize that the current crisis will soon ensnare the debt-ceiling vote that must take place by Oct. 17. This is prompting a geyser of political analysis to explain why a legislature with a 10 percent approval rating has reached a position where the outcome is a gambit opposed by an overwhelming majority of Americans. As a political scientist, I'd humbly suggest that that standard Political Science 101 models are now pretty much bunk. The bread and butter of American politics is pluralism. Members of Congress want to get elected and re-elected. The way they do that is by pleasing their constituents. Traditionally, the way they did that was by pursuing a mix of policies that pleased the kind of organized, concentrated interests that bothered to go and vote. These policies usually included a slice of pork-barrel politics designed to target groups with a material stake in their representatives, and some symbolic politics designed to target groups with an ideological stake in their representatives. The funny thing is that this time around, the material interests on the GOP side appear to have zero influence over their party, as the Washington Post's Zachary Goldfarb reports: The decision to shut down the government because Democrats would not make major changes to President Obama’s health-care law underscored the fading influence of traditional business interests in the Republican Party — and the rising influence of more confrontational and conservative tea party groups that encouraged Republicans to embrace the shutdown strategy. “While I don’t think the Affordable Care Act is in the best interest of the country, I also don’t think it is in the best interest of the country to shut the government down,” said Harold L. Jackson, executive chairman of Buffalo Supply, a Colorado medical equipment company.… The experience of the Chamber of Commerce, one of Washington’s most powerful lobbying groups, may best illustrate the new tensions between Republicans and the business community. The chamber spent more than $60 million in 2010 and 2012, helping elect tea party Republicans and winning GOP control of the House. But while there have been signs of fraying in the relationship for several years, the GOP’s willingness to defy its strongest business supporters became clearest Tuesday with the shutdown. The Chamber had led more than a hundred business groups in urging Congress to keep the government open. “With the U.S. economy continuing to underperform, the federal government needs to maintain its normal operations,” a Chamber-sponsored letter said Monday, hours before the shutdown. “It is not in the best interest of the employers, employees or the American people to risk a government shutdown that will be economically disruptive and create even more uncertainties for the U.S. economy.” A Chamber spokeswoman played down the differences between Republicans and the trade group, saying businesses don’t back candidates based on a single issue. But other conservative groups were happy to highlight the new wedge dividing the Chamber and the GOP. So it would seem that groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable have waning influence over GOP House members. In part, however, this also reflects the fact that those GOP House members have less that they can offer these interest groups. In an interview with Ezra Klein, National Review's outstanding congressional reporter Robert Costa explained a key dynamic within the House GOP caucus: What we're seeing is the collapse of institutional Republican power. It’s not so much about Boehner. It’s things like the end of earmarks. They move away from Tom DeLay and they think they're improving the House, but now they have nothing to offer their members. The outside groups don't always move votes directly but they create an atmosphere of fear among the members. And so many of these members now live in the conservative world of talk radio and tea party conventions and Fox News invitations. And so the conservative strategy of the moment, no matter how unrealistic it might be, catches fire. The members begin to believe they can achieve things in divided government that most objective observers would believe is impossible. Leaders are dealing with these expectations that wouldn't exist in a normal environment. Mark Schmitt makes a similar point in the New Republic: [T]he modern Republican Party is not strong. It’s something more like a loose association of independent forces, including Tea Party–backed members, those with their own sources of campaign money from ideological backers, many with seats so safe that they can happily ignore all their non-conservative constituents, and outside agents like Heritage Foundation President Jim DeMint, who BusinessWeek recently described as the de facto Speaker of the House. Many of its politicians have deliberately cut themselves off from all the incentives that traditionally moderate and stabilize politics—earmarks, constituent service (many offices say they won’t help constituents maneuver the ACA), and infrastructure spending. With safe seats, and hearing little dissent at home, they are able to do so. Cutting themselves off from the incentive to build and maintain a strong and viable party is part of the same story. What's remarkable is how quickly this transformation of the GOP has been. A decade ago, we were reading about ambitious initiatives like the "K Street Project," designed to ensure that powerful material interest groups strengthened ties with the Republican Party. Now it's the ideological interests that are ascendant -- and this poses enormous challenges to the American body politic. The thing about standard interest-group politics is that bargains could be struck. Any member of Congress or interest group that didn't like the contours of a deal could be assuaged with a tax loophole here or a public works project there. Now, taken to its extreme, this leads to an incredibly corrupt system of government. At a low level, however, this kind of corruption is the grease that allows governments to do things like pass budgets and honor its debts. Ideological interest groups are much harder to buy off, however. Their reason for existence is to push their ideas, and most of them will not accept half-measures. This leads to a situation where they benefit more from deadlock than from a bargain. Which is great for the Club for Growth … and lousy for the rest of the country. The fact that this transformation of the GOP's internal organization took place in under a decade suggests that it could also reverse course just as quickly. That said, it's becoming harder and harder to talk about what's happening in Washington as "politics as usual." Because the dynamics of American politics now look very different than they did even a decade ago.